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IN RESPONSE TO A RESTATEMENT OF CORPORATE
FREEZEOUTS
MICHAEL D. GoLi~MAN
DONALD J. WOLFE, JR.*
In Singer v. Magnavox Co.,' the Delaware Supreme Court declared
that cash-out mergers initiated by a majority stockholder would be permit-
ted only upon satisfaction of a two-pronged test: (1) that a proper business
purpose for the contemplated merger can be demonstrated; and (2) that
the terms of the proposed merger are entirely fair to the minority share-
holders. 2 Perhaps the most interesting and provoking commentary in the
welter of criticism that has arisen in the wake of Singer,3 is that of Profes-
sors Victor Brudney and Marvin A. Chirelstein, in their 1978 article enti-
tled A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts. 4 Their treatise suggests that
an objective standard be established to ensure fair dealing between inside
and outside shareholders.5 Such a standard would relieve the uncertainty
prompted by the Singer decision and would permit the consequences of
any transaction to be reasonably predictable. This article will review the
Singer opinion and critique the standards promulgated by Brudney and
Chirelstein in order to support the framework adopted by the Singer court
for analyzing freezeout mergers.
Among the numerous 1967 revisions to the Delaware General Corpora-
* Members of the Bar of the State of Delaware.
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Certain shareholders of The Magnavox Co. brought the Singer
action following the merger of that company into a wholly owned subsidiary of the North
American Philips Corp. in July 1975. The plaintiffs alleged that the merger was fraudulent
since it served no business purpose other than terminating the participation of the minority
shareholders in the venture. Id. at 972. The shareholders sought nullification of the corporate
merger and compensatory damages. Id. The Court of Chancery had dismissed the action,
holding that the merger was not fraudulent merely because it accomplished no other purpose
than to eliminate the minority shareholders. 367 A.2d 1349, 1358 (Del. Ch. 1976). However,
the Delaware Supreme Court held on appeal that the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause
of action against the majority shareholders for breach of fiduciary obligations and reversed
the Court of Chancery. 380 A.2d at 980.
2 380 A.2d at 979-80.
See, e.g., 66 CALiF. L. REv. 118 (1978); 57 N.C. L. REv. 163 (1978); 54 NOTRE DA LAw.
.149 (1978); 31 VAND. L. Rzv. 183 (1978); 64 VA. L. RIv. 1101 (1978).
87 YALE L. J. 1354 (1978).
See text accompanying notes 33-37 infra.
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tion Law was an amendment to section 251 which broadly expanded the
types of permissible consideration to effect a long-form merger of Delaware
corporations.' Prior to that revision, section 251(b) mandated that every
shareholder of each corporation involved in the merger be given a continu-
ing interest in the surviving corporation and permitted cash to be utilized
only in lieu of issuing fractional shares.7 However, even prior to 1967, when
a parent merged with a subsidiary in which it owned 90% or more of the
outstanding shares in a short-form merger, section 253 authorized a cash-
out or squeeze-out merger.' In contrast, the 1967 amendment to section 251
provided that a freezeout or cash-out of shareholders could be effected
upon any merger.' The amended statute created the apparent absolute
power in a majority stockholder to eliminate the minority interests com-
pletely from further participation in the corporate enterprise by merging
the corporation into a wholly owned subsidiary and exchanging cash for the
minority shares. Although the Delaware Supreme Court specifically up-
held the validity of the short-form merger statute in Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc.," this broad power, at least in part, rendered inevitable the
judicial inquiry undertaken some ten years later in Singer v. Magnavox Co.
While the Singer decision appears contrary to the philosophy of the
1 56 Del. Laws, ch. 50, § 251 (1967). Section 251(b) stated in relevant part:
The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or consolidate
shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation. The
agreement shall state ... (4) the manner of converting the shares of each of the
constituent corporations into shares or other securities of the corporation surviving
or resulting from the merger or consolidation and, if any shares of any of the
constituent corporations are not to be converted solely into shares or other securities
of the surviving or resulting corporation, the amount of cash or securities of any
other corporation which is to be paid or delivered to the holders of such shares in
exchange for or upon the surrender of such shares, which cash or securities of any
other corporation may be in addition to the shares or other securities of the surviv-
ing or resulting corporation into which any of the shares of any of the constituent
corporations are to be converted; and (5) such other details or provisions as are
deemed desirable, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, a
provision for the payment of cash in lieu of the issuance of fractional shares of the
surviving or resulting corporation.
Id.
36 Del. Laws, ch. 135, § 18 (1929); 50 Del. Laws, ch. 467, § 4 (1955).
51 Del. Laws, ch. 121, § 253 (1957).
56 Del. Laws, ch. 50, § 251 (1967).
10 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962). In Stauffer, the plaintiff-stockholder alleged con-
structive fraud in the merger of Standard Brands with Planters Nut and Chocolate Corp.
based on the cash-out price paid for the outstanding minority stock. The plaintiff sought to
set aside the merger and perhaps recover the difference in value of the shares. 187 A.2d at
80. The court upheld the validity of a short-form freezeout merger and held the plaintiff's
statutory remedy of appraisal was exclusive. Id. Additionally, the court expressed skepticism
concerning proof of such fraudulent conduct in any short-form merger "because the very
purpose of the statute is to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the
minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise." Id. This rationale might equally apply to
long-form mergers and thus appears inconsistent with the Singer decision.
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short-form merger statute as expressed in Stauffer," the legal principles
relied upon by the Singer court are rooted in a number of solid decisions
which were rendered well in advance of the 1967 statutory revisions.' 2
Indeed, the Singer opinion represents the inevitable culmination of several
longstanding lines of common law authority. Paramount among these con-
verging legal principles is the fiduciary. duty of fair dealing owed by a
majority stockholder to the minority interests in a merger context. 3 This
fiduciary duty is founded upon the potential for abuse of the corporate
machinery which invariably arises when one of the parties stands in a
position to control both sides of a transaction. In such a situation, even
prior to Singer, the Delaware rule required the self-dealing majority share-
holder to shoulder the burden of demonstrating the overall fairness of any
proposed transaction in the face of careful judicial scrutiny.
A second, more general common law maxim prohibits corporate fidu-
ciaries, including officers, directors and majority shareholders, from ma-
nipulating the corporate machinery for personal interests to the detriment
of minority shareholders.15 Even corporate transactions which are facially
proper and entirely in accordance with the literal requirements of a statute
may be designed to accomplish improper purposes. For example, in
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,"6 a group of minority shareholders
attempted to challenge the incumbent management in a proxy contest. '
7
To obstruct this effort, the management attempted to advance the date of
the annual stockholders' meeting by altering the corporate by-laws. Al-
though the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged that the management
had complied with the technical statutory requirements regarding this
action, the court ievertheless enjoined the early meeting. 8 The Schnell
court merely observed that "inequitable action does not become permissi-
ble simply because it is legally possible." 9 Therefore, because self-dealing
can exist in spite of meticulous compliance with statutory procedure, the
propriety of and necessity for judicial scrutiny of the motives and purposes
behind corporate transactions remains.
" See note 10 supra.
22 See text accompanying notes 12-27 infra.
'3 See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (1952);
Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd 278 A.2d 467 (1970); David
J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 434-35 (Del. Ch. 1968).
" Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952).
'5 See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d.503, 510 (1939); Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140,
143 (Del. Ch. 1975); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769, 775-
76 (Del. Ch. 1967).
26 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
'7 In Schnell, a group of dissident shareholders organized to challenge the incumbent
management in a proxy contest for control of the corporation. Id. at 438-39. The management
altered the corporate by-laws to disrupt the challenge and employed other tactics to defeat
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An additional common law basis for the Singer decision is provided by
a number of scattered opinions which focus on the qualified right of a
stockholder to remain a participant in the corporate enterprise.2 0 Although
these cases were argued before the Singer court, they were not discussed
at any length in its opinion. The first of these cases, Starring v. American
Hair & Felt Co., 21 involved an attempted redemption and selective reissu-
ance of the common stock of the corporation, which thereby cashed out a
pre-designated minority of the shareholders. The company apparently de-
sired that control of the business rest solely in the hands of members of
the tanning industry. Since non-industry shareholders previously had ac-
quired a limited interest in the corporation, the company attempted to
exclude this minority from further participation in the business through a
redemption and reissuance plan.22 The opinion does not recite whether a
single majority shareholder controlled the corporation and it does not al-
lude to or rely upon the presence of any fiduciary obligations. Although the
Starring court ultimately prohibited the transaction on other grounds,n
the court questioned the legality of the proposed action and expressed
serious doubts about the capacity of a corporate entity to coerce stockhold-
ers into forfeiting continued participation in the venture."
This judicial discomfort with procedures designed to eliminate selected
stockholders solely to serve the interests of the remaining parties was also
expressed in Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co.21 The Allaun action involved
an unsuccessful attack upon a plan for the sale of corporate assets which
had been approved by a majority of the stockholders, who also served as
directors of the corporation. The directors allegedly had a personal interest
in approving the sale at an inadequate price and had done so to the detri-
ment of the excluded shareholders.26 Apparently, the force of the evidence
mustered by the plaintiff did not match the vehemence of his allegations,
" See text accompanying notes 21-28 infra.
21 21 Del. Ch. 380, 191 A. 887 (Del. Ch. 1937).
2 The corporate charter of the American Hair & Felt Co. conferred the power on the
company to call and redeem all of its outstanding common stock at a fixed price. 191 A. at
889. The majority shareholders adopted concurrent resolutions which redeemed outstanding
stock and reissued the stock to members of the tanning industry currently holding such
investments. Id.
11 The Starring court held that no Delaware statutory authority permitted a redemption
and selective reissuance to reduce the company's capital. 191 A. at 892.
24 The Starring court questioned the equity of the redemption and reissuance plan,
stating:
Now admitting for the moment that the lawful authority exists in a corporation
created under the Delaware act to take a power to redeem what is familiarly known
as common stock, it may be a serious question whether it can exercise such a power
when the avowed purpose is simply to get rid of certain stockholders of a given class
whose presence in the stockholding group is undesirable to the rest, by compelling
the undesirables to sell out to the chosen ones who are permitted to stay in.
191 A. at 890.
- 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (Del. Ch. 1929).
26 147 A. at 259.
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for the transaction ultimately was consummated without judicial interven-
tion.Y Although the Allaun court recognized the ability of the majority
interests to compel abandonment of a venture by selling off corporate
assets, the court nevertheless indicated that equity would restrain transac-
tions designed solely to freezeout minority interests. 
2
Tle decisions placing fiduciary responsibility upon majority stockhold-
ers, and those declaring that such a duty will not be deemed satisfied
through mere statutory compliance where an inequitable purpose is
thereby served, are complemented by those which acknowledge that, inde-
pendent of fiduciary considerations, the inherent right of a stockholder to
continue his participation in the corporate enterprise must be preserved
against routine abrogation. The Delaware Supreme Court obviously dis-
tilled from these separate lines of authority the basis for its Singer decision
and used them synergistically to support its explicit suspicion of any cash-
out merger through which the majority shareholder gains full equitable
ownership of the enterprise. Thus, the Singer court declared that "a Dela-
ware Court will not be indifferent to the purpose of a merger when a freeze-
out of minority shareholders on a cash-out basis is alleged to be its sole
purpose. ' 29 The court implemented this judicial wariness by imposing the
burden of proof upon those who would effectuate the freezeout to demon-
strate a bona fide corporate purpose." Unabashed attempts on the part of
fiduciaries to eliminate the minority merely to serve the majority's per-
sonal interests are deemed intrinsically improper notwithstanding the pur-
ported fairness of the terms through which the contemplated elimination
would be effected. The overall fairness of the terms of the cash-out, the
second part of the standard, will be considered under the Singer analysis
only after the majority has established that a valid corporate purpose
exists.2 '
This primary emphasis by the Singer court on the purpose or motive
of the majority is central to much of the criticism engendered by the
decision. Clearly, the court was willing to admit that in some circum-
stances, however infrequent, the corporate enterprise as a whole could be
2 Id. at 262-63.
21 The Allaun court acknowledged that:
[I]t is the right of the majority in a corporation to practically desert the
corporate venture by selling out its assets and, thereby, in the case of a highly
profitable concern, deprive their associates of the opportunity to reap gains in the
future by continuing in the business, provided the terms and conditions of the sale
are fair to the corporation. I suppose, however, if the sale is only a "freezing out"
one by which the majority use their power to sell to themselves in another guise
and thereby carry on in the business without their former associates of the minority,
equity would doubtless restrain it regardless of the fairness of price.
Id. at 260. Similarly, in Bennett v. Breuil Petro. Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (1953), the
court stated that a freezeout majority action would be actionable without regard to the
fairness of the price paid for the minority shares. Id. at 239.
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977).
1* 380 A.2d at 976.
31 Id.
1979]
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improved by such a merger. The "proper purpose test," as it has been
labeled, was undoubtedly designed to balance the potential for corporate
improvement against the right of the minority to continue its participation
in the venture. Even aside from the inherent problems of proof and credi-
bility arising from this subjective standard, it must be conceded that the
distinction between a purpose designed to benefit the surviving corpora-
tion and one designed to benefit the majority, who subsequently become
the sole owners of the surviving corporation, is often difficult to perceive.2
This difficulty has led some to suggest that the application of such a test
in fact defeats the goal to which Singer aspires.n
Perhaps the most thoughtful and certainly the most inventive of the
critical comments engendered by Singer are those of Professors Brudney
and Chirelstein.3 4 Their analysis generally takes the Delaware Court to
task for the ambiguities created by the Singer opinion and identifies two
particular errors: (1) a failure to perceive that all freezeout mergers are not
alike;n and (2) the impossibility of predicting, through application of the
proper purpose test, whether a freezeout is justifiable under any given set
of circumstances.38 The Brudney-Chirelstein proposal seeks to avoid these
perceived deficiencies by (1) classifying all freezeout mergers into three
distinct categories to be governed by three equally distinct rules;3 7 and (2)
eliminating all reference to the presence or absence of a valid purpose
underlying the transaction.3
31 The Delaware Supreme Court is itself aware of this difficulty. See Tanzer v. Interna-
tional Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Del. 1977). In his original concurring opinion
in Singer, Justice McNeilly criticized the court's emphasis upon the need for a business
purpose in order to justify a freezeout, stating:
I am inclined to think, however, that the opinion waffles in its attempt to
establish guidelines for future merger litigation with emphasis on the coined phrase
"business purpose" which standing alone connotes nothing magic or definitive.
Does it mean to say that to satisfy the valid business purpose requirement a corpo-
ration must show a compelling corporate need to go private in order to function as
a viable business, or does it mean something less? Repeating Justice Duffy's unan-
swered inquiries, whose purpose and whose business are we testing?
Singer v. Magnavox Co., No. 289, 1976 (Del. Sept. 23, 1977) (concurring opinion of McNeilly,
J., subsequently withdrawn and revised).
Perhaps as a result of this criticism, the majority opinion was amended to delete many
of the original references to the need for a business purpose. The opinion now focuses more
clearly on the need for a proper purpose, i.e., not solely for the purpose of eliminating the
minority. This amendment in turn led Justice McNeilly to delete this criticism from his
concurring opinion.
3 Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L. J. 1354,
1356 (1978).
31 Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L. J. 1354
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein].
11 Id. at 1356.
38 Id.
37 Brudney and Chirelstein suggest that freezeout mergers may be classified into three
distinct categories: (a) two-step integrated mergers; (b) going private transactions; and (c)
mergers of long-held affiliates. See id. at 1359-76.
Is According to the Brudney and Chirelstein analysis, the presence or absence of a
[Vol. XXXVI
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The first category established in the Brudney-Chirelstein analysis is the
multi-step merger transaction. Such a transaction generally is initiated by
an unrelated third party, who first tenders for the outstanding shares of
the target company, then obtains a majority interest, and subsequently
completes the acquisition of 100% of the stock by a cash-out merger.39 In
this multi-step category, Brudney and Chirelstein see no basis for requiring
the purchaser to demonstrate a valid purpose for the second-step merger
or to shift the burden of proof so as to require him to establish that the
terms of the merger are entirely fair to the soon-to-be-eliminated minor-
ity." The only constraint suggested upon a multi-step merger is that the
merger price be set no lower than the tender price so as not to induce a
stockholder stampede during the initial step.4 In addition, if an intention
exists on the part of the offeror to consummate a second-step merger at
the time the tender offer is initiated, Brudney and Chirelstein would also
require that the intention be disclosed at the time the offer is commenced.
42
Brudney and Chirelstein explain this indifference to the potential
plight of the minority confronted by the second-step merger through a
superficially appealing analogy between the multi-step acquisition tech-
nique and the one-step, arm's-length merger or sale of asset proposal. They
view the multi-step technique as no more than a stylistic variation upon
the one-step approach, in which the unrelated third-party suitor negotiates
a proposal with the target's board of directors, obtains the approval of that
board and successfully seeks stockholder ratification of the proposal.13 In
this setting, Brudney and Chirelstein observe that the outside suitor is not,
nor should he be, constrained by fiduciary responsibilities either to the
stockholders of the target as a whole or to that minority that may choose
to reject the proposal." Thus, the outsider need demonstrate neither a
bona fide business purpose for his attempted acquisition, nor that the
offered price is a fair one. The directors and shareholders of the target
make the crucial decisions among themselves and, if a majority determines
the price to be acceptable, they are free to force the dissenting minority to
join them in being cashed out of the enterprise. The multi-step acquisition
technique would be subject to no more rigorous regulation under the
proper business purpose will be presumed from the structure of the merger. Id. at 1356.
:' See id. at 1360.
4o Id. at 1365. However, Brudney and Chirelstein welcome judicial surveillance and en-
forcement of the fiduciary obligation of the target's management in such circumstances to
fairly evaluate the tender offer. Id.
" Id. at 1361-62. Brudney and Chirelstein recognize that the public market transactions
and the dangers of deception require a "modicum" of regulation for such mergers, but they
reject the comprehensive review of the transaction which Singer permits. Id.
42 Id.
3 Id. at 1360-61. Rather than approaching the target's board of directors, a two-step
merger bypasses the board and places the merger, issue directly before the stockholders.
Brudney and Chirelstein view the stockholders' decision to sell or retain their interest in the
corporation as a majority rule vote on the merger itself. Id.
" Id. at 1361.
1979]
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Brudney-Chirelstein approach. The initial step, they argue, merely consti-
tutes the same type of direct referendum among the target stockholders
who register their approval by tendering their shares. 5 The second step
puts the majority approved plan into operation by forcing out the minority
just as the one-step method permits. Accordingly, viewed as an integrated
plan of acquisition, this technique is merely a fragmented form of the one-
step merger under the Brudney-Chirelstein analysis.
Brudney and Chirelstein identify a second category of mergers which
generally are referred to as "going private" in that the ultimate owner of
the target company is already the target entity's controlling shareholder
at the time the merger is conceived and effected." In this situation, the
controlling shareholders wish to terminate public participation in the ven-
ture, often because the market has undervalued the company's shares and
prospects." Professors Brudney and Chirelstein readily concede the pres-
ence of fiduciary responsibilities on the part of the majority stockholder in
these transactions." Their disdain for Singer's motive inquiry arises from
their conviction that no possible corporate purpose can justify the elimina-
tion of the public minority by insiders. In support of this conviction, they
contend that such transactions are utterly void of economic or social bene-
fit.4" In addition, they note that the clear presence of fiduciary duties,
coupled with the potential abuse where no adequate remedy is available,
militate against such mergers. Therefore, Brudney and Chirelstein con-
clude that these transactions should be flatly prohibited, regardless of the
underlying corporate purpose or considerations of fairness.50 They advocate
a conclusive judicial presumption that all such transactions constitute per
se breaches of the fiduciary duties owed to the minority."'
The last of the three freezeout categories described in the Brudney and
Chirelstein Restatement covers cash-out mergers between a parent and its
partially-owned subsidiary where the interrelationship has existed over a
reasonably long period of time.52 Brudney and Chirelstein again acknowl-
edge the existence of fiduciary responsibilities running from the parent to
the minority shareholders of the subsidiary in this context and, therefore,
" Id. at 1360-61.
Id. at 1365. See Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 909-11 (1975). As Brudney and
Chirelstein hasten to point out, the going private merger may in fact take the form of a multi-
step acquisition where it is preceded by a tender offer by the target company for its own
shares. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 34, at 1365 n.20. Notwithstanding their oft-
repeated disdain for the proper purpose test, the authors appear to rely on precisely this factor
to differentiate going private transactions from multi-step acquisitions in this situation.
" Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 34, at 1365.
' Id. at 1365-66. Professor Brudney has previously advocated an even stricter standard
than the Singer court adopted to enforce this fiduciary obligation. See Brudney, A Note on
"Going Private", 61 VA. L. Rav. 1019, 1029-30 (1975).
4' Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 34, at 1366-68.
o Id. at 1368-69.
Id. at 1367.
52 Id. at 1370.
[Vol. XXXVI
IN RESPONSE
note the distinction between this form of transaction and the one-step,
arm's-length merger. 3 Nonetheless, they view mergers between long-
standing affiliates as distinct from going private cash-out mergers. The
perceived difference lies in their recognition of a variety of valid purposes
that may be served through unification of the parent and subsidiary."
Elimination of the minority is perceived as merely an unfortunate, but
incidental, result. Brudney and Chirelstein view those transactions as
"inherently purposive," if only because these mergers necessarily promote
simplified internal management and administration. Therefore, they sug-
gest that the courts release these mergers from the constraints of the Singer
analysis. 5 Instead, they maintain that the courts should presume the exist-
ence of a valid purpose under such circumstances and restrict the extent
of their review to an examination of the fairness of the proposed terms. 6
This limited review would require, at a minimum, a consideration of suffi-
cient value to permit the minority shareholders to acquire the same propor-
tionate interest in the surviving company that they would have received
had the merger contemplated the issuance of common stock in the surviv-
ing corporation."
Notwithstanding their oft-expressed disaffection with the proper pur-
pose test, a review of the Brudney-Chirelstein analysis reveals that, rather
than discarding the approach, they have chosen simply to presume the
results of its application in advance. Indeed, each of the proposed classifi-
cations is based upon an unnecessarily inflexible fundamental assumption
concerning the validity of the purpose served by each category of transac-
tion. Brudney and Chirelstein merely begin their analysis at a point further
along the continuum than the Delaware Supreme Court. Scrutiny of the
underlying purpose, an indispensable aspect of the Singer analysis, thus
is replaced in the Brudney-Chirelstein approach by a superficial examina-
tion of the outer form of the transaction. While such physical characteris-
tics, in many instances, may provide helpful evidence of the underlying
purpose for the freezeout, we disagree with the conclusive effect which
Brudney and Chirelstein accord these indicia.
The crucial considerations in passing on the acceptability of freezeout
transactions include: (1) whether the merger serves a proper purpose, and
(2) whether that purpose is of sufficient economic and social value to
Id. at 1370-71.
" Brudney and Chirelstein note the following benefits which often justify the acquisition
of subsidiaries by the parent corporation: (a) operating economies, (b) elimination of dupli-
cated functions, (c) tax savings, (d) financial and market gains, (e) elimination of fiduciary
conflicts, and (f) other "synergistic" gains. Id. at 1371.
m See id. at 1371-72.
" See id. at 1372.
11 Id. at 1374-75. As Brudney and Chirelstein suggest, such a test would not be suffi-
ciently rigorous where the surviving corporation is a closely held parent since the use of cash
or debt in any amount would in that situation still result in the effective eliminating of the
minority from participation in the combined corporate enterprise. They therefore suggest that
under such circumstances the use of cash or debt may be inherently unfair. Id. at 1374.
1979]
692 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
justify termination of the minority's continued participation.58 Therefore,
these considerations should remain the central aspects of freezeout evalua-
tions. Although it is incontrovertible that shifting the focus from these
often amorphous inquiries to an examination of the objective physical
characteristics of the merger would simplify the judicial task and make the
results of any transaction more predictable, such a shift would necessarily
render the conclusion of the inquiry less accurate.
The Singer approach, for all its difficulties of application, is preferable
for two reasons. First, the Singer analysis directly questions the purpose
of the merger, which, in essence, is the primary factor in determining the
acceptability of the freezeout. Second, this approach leaves open the ques-
tion of what constitutes a proper purpose in any given factual circum-
stances and avoids the mechanical application of Brudney and Chirel-
stein's rigid classifications. Brudney and Chirelstein criticize Singer's fail-
ure to recognize that all freezeout mergers are not alike. Yet, the rigidity
fostered in their own approach, which results from assumptions respecting
the relationship between corporate purpose and the external form of the
transaction, render it similarly susceptible to these very criticisms. Moreo-
ver, placing dispositive emphasis on the Brudney-Chirelstein approach
merely will require majority stockholders to structure transactions that
"look right," without necessarily precluding those that operate inequita-
bly. The application of the Brudney-Chirelstein analysis to the circum-
stances presented by typical merger transactions demonstrates the danger
of rigid reliance upon form to the exclusion of substance.
A. The Two-Step Merger
Culled to its essence, the Brudney-Chirelstein analysis of two-step ac-
quisitions stands or falls on the analogy it seeks to draw between such
transactions and the one-step, arm's-length, negotiated merger or sale of
assets. Since little or no examination of purpose or fairness is judicially
required in the one-step situation," comparison with the two-step acquisi-
tion leads Brudney and Chirelstein to conclude that the latter should be
similarly unfettered." The tendering of shares by the majority in the two-
step merger is equated with majority stockholder votes in the one-step
transaction, since the tendering stockholders in effect have registered their
approval by selling their shares.6 Yet, there exists a crucial distinction
between the two transactions which justifies a more rigorous scrutiny of
multi-step acquisitions. Specifically, in a one-step transaction, the board
of directors of the target company actively participates in and approves of
the merger. In order to reach the stockholders with a one-step merger or
sale of assets proposal, the suitor first must obtain the approval of the
" See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979-80 (Del. 1977).





target's directors and assure them of the essential fairness of the proposal.
This prerequisite ensures that the well-informed expertise and fiduciary
responsibilities of the board will be brought to bear upon the suitor's pro-
posal. Thus, the intrinsic fairness of the proposal is regulated, since unfair
or inadequate proposals probably will not receive the approval necessary
for stockholder consideration.
In the two-step acquisition, the protection afforded by an independent
fiduciary's careful scrutiny is notably absent. Indeed, the two-step strategy
is often adopted primarily to avoid the need to deal with a powerful,
knowledgeable and potentially hostile board. The initiation of a tender
offer acquisition severely erodes the bargaining power of the board. There
is little or no room to repudiate. The target board's role is reduced either
to providing a limited or neutral commentary on the proposal or waging
an all out battle to defeat the offer at the risk of huge expense and potential
exposure of personal liability to their own shareholders. Thus, even assum-
ing that the terms of the second-step merger are publicized contempora-
neously with the tender offer,62 there is no negotiation or effective evalua-
tion of either these terms or the offer price. The initial step is often little
more than a proposed contract of adhesion at a price dictated solely by the
state of the market for the target's shares, which may not provide an
accurate barometer of such equity holdings. Even when they represent a
premium over market values, tender offers generally do not produce as
high a price as the board of directors could obtain through knowledgeable
arm's-length negotiations." This observation constitutes yet another factor
which often prompts a suitor to choose the two-step method over direct
negotiations with the target's board. Finally, even under the Brudney-
Chirelstein proposal which would require that the second-step price be no
lower than the final offer,"' stockholders are faced with the choice of either
immediately accepting the offered premium in the first step or gambling
on the prospect of receiving the same price at a later date under uncertain
market conditions and on terms set solely by the new majority owner.
While simultaneously safeguarding minority interests, the stockholder
vote that routinely characterizes one-step acquisitions is a more accurate
test of the true desires of target shareholders than the "direct referendum"
which the tender offer purportedly affords. Therefore, courts should thor-
oughly investigate the fairness of the second-step merger proposal to the
non-tendering minority notwithstanding the prior tender of a majority of
the outstanding shares.
Brudney and Chirelstein rely on the same analogy to an arm's-length
one-step merger to establish their point that there is no need to examine
the purpose behind the second-step freezeout.1 In this regard, they argue
62 See id. at 1361.
13 Id. at 1363-64 n.18.
" Id. at 1361-62.
,5 Id. at 1360-61.
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that the temporary status as majority stockholder between the first and
second steps does not warrant the imposition of fiduciary duties so long as
that status is merely transitional." However, a majority stockholder who
controls the corporation for any reasonable period of time should be sad-
dled with the fiduciary duties of fair dealing and loyalty to the minority
irrespective of his prior status as an unrelated outsider. His new position
creates all of the potential for abuse of the corporate machinery that ac-
crues to any majority-minority situation. He is privy to inside information
and is able to evaluate market conditions, set the terms upon which the
merger will be accomplished and select the most advantageous time from
his own point of view to eliminate the minority. Such abuses are the same
as those which Brudney and Chirelstein apprehend with alarm in the pure
"going private" category." The potential for abuse in this kind of transac-
tion is alleviated only slightly by mandating a purchase price no lower than
that offered in the first step tender offer. As the time between the first and
second step increases, the potential for majority shareholder abuse in-
creases as well. Therefore, the intensity of judicial scrutiny regarding the
necessity of eliminating the minority from continued participation in the
corporation should similarly increase. The minority should be entitled to
retain their investment -in the enterprise unless a valid reason for their
elimination can be demonstrated. This protection is best afforded through
the Singer proper purpose requirement.
Those shareholders who have refused to tender their securities have
made a conscious decision to remain in the enterprise. In a second step
freezeout, it makes little difference to them that the party fixing the terms
of the merger on both sides of the transaction recently arrived on the scene
by means of a tender offer. In both instances the shareholder is being forced
out against his will by a party in a position to dictate the terms for his own
benefit. The Singer decision holds that these stockholders may not be
eliminated from the enterprise in the absence of both a proper purpose and
equitable terms. Those stockholders who have refused to sell their stock
at the initial tender offer stage have a right to remain in the company.
They should not be frozen out simply because a suitor has succeeded in
acquiring a majority of stock in the marketplace and now wants to elimi-
nate them. Such action should be permitted only if there exists a proper
purpose for doing so and if the terms guarantee that the minority will be
treated fairly.
B. Going Private Mergers
While the most objectionable form of freezeout concededly is included
within this category," to bar all going private transactions absolutely is
See id. at 1361.
See id. at 1365-66.
' In a recent opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court noted the persuasiveness of Brudney
and Chirelstein's position that a pure going private transaction may call for "the strictest
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unduly rigid and would preclude some apparently justifiable transactions.
In certain instances, valid corporate purposes may militate in favor of such
consolidations. 9 Brudney and Chirelstein maintain that the avoidance of
the burdensome and ever-increasing expenses of SEC reporting and ac-
counting requirements is an inadequate purpose, since these costs are in-
curred for the benefit of the public minority to be eliminated.70 Yet, it is
difficult to perceive any difference between this allegedly improper pur-
pose and the elimination of conflicts of interest, deemed "inherently pur-
posive" by Brudney and Chirelstein in parent-subsidiary mergers. 7' These
conflicts of interest also arise solely because of the participation of minor-
ity shareholders. The costs of public ownership in any degree are substan-
tial and the burden imposed on the corporation because of these costs may
be out of proportion to the benefits afforded to the minority interests. In
any case, it appears senseless to dictate an inflexible rule which forecloses
such possibilities. If a proposed freezeout is not justified under particular
circumstances, the Singer tests adequately will serve to prevent the frui-
tion of the transaction.
Situations will arise in which the majority of the minority wish to
tender their shares for cash but are prevented from doing so because the
majority owner will not buy less than all of the minority shares and a few
holders do not favor the cash-out. If the majority is foreclosed. from effect-
ing a merger, as Brudney and Chirelstein advocate, these minority share-
holders are "frozen-in" even though an absolute majority of the minority
endorse the transaction. Although Brudney and Chirelstein reject this ar-
gument by asserting that the existence of a thin market itself does not
justify the freezeout," their approach is not responsive to the difficulties
encountered by the frozen-in minority shareholder. Alternatively, we sug-
gest that courts condition approval of this type of cash-out merger upon
the affirmative vote of a majority of the minority shareholders. Assuming
full and fair disclosure, the dangers of a controlling presence are rendered
irrelevant since the majority cannot participate in the decision. At least,
where a majority of the minority approval has been obtained, the burden
of proof on the fairness issue should shift to a plaintiff challenging the
proposed transaction.
The Singer court may not have considered or intended to address the
freeze-in situation.7 In one recent decision by the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery, the court recognized the presence of this condition as a basis for
distinguishing Singer upon a motion for certification of a class of minority
observance of the law of fiduciary duty." Roland. Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, No. 153, 1978, slip op.
at 13 (Del. Aug. 6, 1979). Nonetheless, the two-pronged Singer doctrine remains applicable.
" See Tanzer Econ. Assoc., Inc. v. Universal Food Spec., Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383
N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
70 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 34, at 1366-67.
11 Id. at 1371.
72 Id. at 1369.
" See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979).
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stockholders.74 However, the Delaware courts clearly will confront and rule
upon the effect of majority of the minority approval in freezeout situations
in the near future.7" Whatever approach is ultimately adopted by the
courts, a flat prohibition against all going private transactions does not
remedy the problems presented to the frozen-in minority shareholder.
While the Brudney and Chirelstein approach may simplify the freezeout
analysis, it does so at the expense of judicial flexibility and a responsive-
ness to diverse economic forces.
C. Merger of Affiliates
Brudney and Chirelstein posit that the existence of a valid business
purpose with respect to mergers between parent corporations and their
longstanding partially-owned subsidiaries is impossible to deny." They
note that cash-out mergers of this type are "inherently purposive" in na-
ture due to the elimination of duplicated functions, tax savings, financial
and stock market gains, and other synergistic increments to the value of
the enterprise.7 Moreover, Brudney and Chirelstein suggest that even if
such commercial benefits are only minimally significant, other advantages
such as avoidance of potential conflicts of interests and improvements in
intercorporate administrative efficiency are a priori sufficient to satisfy the
Singer purpose test.78 A rigid and mechanical conclusion again results from
7, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., C.A. No. 5642 (Del. Ch. April 15, 1979). In the course of his
decision, Vice Chancellor Brown states:
Here, however, the situation differs [from that in Singer). As the defendants point
out, the merger agreement here was structured so that it could not be approved
unless it received the favorable vote of a majority of the 49.5 percent minority
shares. It could not be approved solely by the majority of UOP's outstanding stock
controlled by Signal as was the case in Singer. As such, under the terms of the
merger agreement, Signal lacked the capacity to use its voting position as majority
shareholder to bring about a cash-out merger in violation of a fiduciary duty owed
to the minority. Rather, the decision was left to the minority shareholders, and they
voted overwhelmingly in favor of the merger and its cash-out terms.
Id., slip op. at 10. Also see the discussion of the effect of majority of the minority approval in
Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
11 The matter was raised on remand in Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402
A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979) and discussed by Vice Chancellor Hartnett. The Vice Chancellor
declined to decide the issue, however, citing the explicit instructions of the Delaware Supreme
Court on the matter of burden of proof as the law of the case. Id. at 386.
Subsequently, in Wayne v. Utilities & Indus. Corp., C.A. No. 5744 (Del. Ch. July 19,
1979). Chancellor Marvel, in approving the settlement of an action in which the plaintiff
sought to enjoin a freezeout merger, noted that the new settlement merger proposal required
stockholder approval at a special meeting of the minority stockholders. This element "would
appear to negative any contention that the majority stockholders are exercising their coercive
power to effect a merger for their exclusive benefit and that such majority's business purpose
in going private for its own best interests is not to be forced on the minority public stockhold-
ers." Id., slip op. at 7.
71 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 34, at 1371.
" See note 54 supra.
19 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 34, at 1371-72.
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the application of their test which is tied solely to the appearance of the
transaction.
First, the purported benefits of such mergers will not always warrant
the wholesale elimination of sizeable minority interests. Moreover, what-
ever laudable results these transactions produce may be merely incidental
to the actual objective of eliminating an undesirable minority interest. For
example, it is manifest that where the parent/majority stockholder effects
a freezeout merger solely to promote its own interests, a court should
restrain the transaction. Yet, the Brudney and Chirelstein analysis would
deem the evidence of such a purpose meaningless, since the incidental (and
perhaps insignificant) benefits would control. The mere presence of a prior
relationship between a parent and subsidiary does not preclude the possi-
bility that the parent may employ the freezeout technique solely for the
purpose of eliminating the minority. Therefore, a court should subject all
such transactions to the Singer standard regardless of prior relationships
between the parties.
Second, none of the "inherently purposive" benefits recited by Brudney
and Chirelstein compel the use of a freezeout merger. Elimination of dupli-
cate departments, personnel, and corporate business processes, tax sav-
ings, financial improvements incidental to corporate unification and
avoidance of conflicts of interests generally can be accomplished by issuing
stock in the parent company as consideration for the merger. No reason
immediately appears for terminating the minority's participation to ac-
complish these goals. Although particular circumstances may justify
freezeouts in certain cases, the parent-fiduciary should carry the burden
of demonstrating the necessity of such action. The fact that a merger would
be commercially or socially beneficial alone does not warrant the conclu-
sion that a freezeout of the minority is justified. In this category as well,
the two-pronged Singer test should be employed. In the absence of a dem-
onstration by the parent that a valid corporate purpose is served by cash-
ing out the minority, the transaction should be prohibited.
There can be little doubt that the categories identified by Brudney and
Chirelstein are of significant value in passing upon the presence or absence
of a valid purpose for effectuating a cash-out merger and they create useful
tools for the analysis of each transaction. However, they should not be
given the conclusive effect that their creators propose nor should they be
deemed to eliminate the need for an inquiry under Singer into the purpose
of the transaction. Such an approach would result in unwarranted and
mechanical judicial disapproval of innocuous merger proposals merely be-
cause of their form. Alternatively, the courts might create exceptions so
numerous as to overwhelm the general rules themselves. The Brudney and
Chirelstein article itself foreshadows the latter possibility since its foot-
notes recite a litany of suggested and potential limitations upon the appli-
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cation of these catagories The expressed goal of simplifying the freezeout
analysis would be ill-served in either event.
11 See, e.g., id. at 1356-57 n.9, 1361-62 n.15 & 16, 1363 n.18, 1367 n.24, 1372 n.32, 1373-
74 n.35.
